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NOTES
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS: SOME
PROBLEMS AND A PROPOSAL
Before a federal district court can grant an injunction against the
enforcement of a state' or federal2 statute on the ground that the
statute is unconstitutional, the case must be heard and determined by
a three-judge district court.4 The unfortunate draftsmanship 5 of the
three-judge court statutes and the judicial gloss on those statutes have
often caused confusion and delay because of the difficulty of determining whether a three-judge court is required in any given case. 6
1 Section 2281 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act provides:
Injunction against enforcement of State statute; three-judge court required.
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order-made
r.o
mjssio
ctiug-umder State statutes, shall not
b-an...adit
be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
2 Section 2282 of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act states:
Injunction against enforcement of Federal statute; three-judge court required.
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of
the United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964).
3 Also, in the case of the states, "an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes .... 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
4 The composition and procedure of three-judge district courts is described at length
in 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
5 Section 2281 has been described as "long-winded, repetitive, and sloppy in draftsmanship." Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHi.
L. REv. 1, 12 (1964).
6 For example, consider the Tureaud cases. Before the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Mr. Tureaud sought an injunction compelling
his admission to an all-white state college in Louisiana on the ground that colleges open
to Negroes were not equal to white colleges as required by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). A single district judge granted the injunction. In Bd. of Supervisors v. Tureaud,
207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953), vacated per curiam, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the case was one for a three-judge court. Judge Rives dissented
on the apparently correct ground that the Louisiana statute requiring segregation was
constitutional (under Plessy v. Ferguson) and that all that had been litigated was the
fact question of whether the schools available for Negroes were equal to white schools.
Brown v. Board of Education was then decided. The Supreme Court vacated the
Tureaud judgment and remanded "for consideration in the light of ... Brown v. Board
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Although it has been persuasively argued that the three-judge court
system has outlived its usefulness, 7 Congress has shown no inclination
8
to dispense with such courts in constitutional cases.
Conceptualistic niceties and procedural quibbles have muddled the
guidelines for determining when a three-judge court is needed. In particular, the doctrine that a three-judge court is not required to enjoin
enforcement of a statute which is "clearly unconstitutional" or to
refuse to enjoin a statute which is "clearly constitutional"'10 has introduced an additional issue into much constitutional litigation. The rule
that a single district judge may enjoin the enforcement of a state statute
that is of only local applicability has generated needless uncertainty."
Furthermore, procedures concerning the convening of three-judge
courts and the review of their decisions (as well as the review of decisions not to convene) have troubled courts and litigants.
The rules concerning three-judge court jurisdiction are the result
of a compromise between the desire to have certain cases receive the
deliberation of three judges and the need to use judicial manpower
efficiently. By revising the method of trial of three-judge cases to give a
single judge greater powers and by reforming the system of appellate
review of three-judge court decisions, the use of such courts can be
of Education... and conditions that now prevail." 347 U.S. at 971. Again, a single district
judge issued an injunction. In Bd. of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955),
the court of appeals affirmed. The court then granted a rehearing, and in Bd. of Supervisors v. Tureaud, 226 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955), set aside its previous decision; but on

rehearing the case en banc the Fifth Circuit reinstated the original judgment. Bd. of
Supervisors v. Tureaud, 228 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956). In view
of the lapse of nearly three years between the first and last opinions in the case by the
court of appeals, there is a certain irony in Judge Cameron's dissenting wail that "[d]elusive interests of haste should not be permitted to obscure substantial requirements of

orderly procedure." 228 F.2d at 901, quoting Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 229
U.S. 259, 268 (1936).
7 See Comment, The Three-judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A
ProceduralAnachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. Riv.555, 563-71 (1960). Contra, Note, The ThreeJudge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 H~auv. L. REv. 299,

301-06 (1963).
8 Indeed, two new classes of three-judge court cases were added by the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 19 71(g) (Supp. III 1967) provides for three-judge determination
of voting rights cases at the request of the Attorney General or any defendant. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-5(b) (1964) provides for three-judge courts in public accommodations cases if
the Attorney General certifies that the case is one of "general public importance." But cf.
S. 2687, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), which would have made orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission reviewable in the cofirts of appealB rather than by three-judge
district courts.
9 See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
10 See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
11 See text accompanying notes 42-50 infra.
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made more efficient. As a result, clearer lines can be drawn to define
three-judge court jurisdiction.

THE JURISDICTION OF THREE-JUDGE COURTS

In Ex parte Young 12 the Supreme Court emasculated the eleventh
amendment 13 by holding that a federal court could enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute. In 1910, two years after the
Young decision, Congress enacted legislation providing that an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of a state statute could be
issued only by a three-judge district court. 4 The purpose of the act was
two-fold: first, to assuage injury to state sensibilities by requiring that
a tribunal more impressive than a single judge be convened before
state legislation is declared unconstitutional; second, to ensure that the
drastic remedy of an injunction is not imposed without adequate deliberation.15 In 1937, congressional concern over judicial destruction of
the New Deal led to legislation requiring three-judge courts in suits
to enjoin federal legislation.' 6 In order to expedite important cases,
Congress provided for direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court
17
from the decision of a three-judge court. '
A. "Clearly Constitutional"and "Clearly Unconstitutional"Statutes
Arguably nothing in the three-judge court statutes prevents a
single judge from dismissing a claim on the merits,' 8 but it has always
been held that such action cannot be taken.' 9 A single judge can, how12 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13 U.S. CONSr. amend. XI bars a suit against a state by a citizen of another state in

a federal court. On its face, the amendment does not seem to bar a suit against a state
by its own citizens, but in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court held
that such a suit cannot be maintained.
14 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557. The present provisions are 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281,2284 (1964).
18 For a brief discussion of the history and policies of the three-judge court statutes
see Currie, supranote 5, at 3-12.
16 Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 782. The present provision is 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(1964).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (1964).
18 The statutes say only that an injunction "shall not be granted" except by a threejudge court. Btt see note 19 infra.
19 See, e.g., Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 589 (1911). Professor Currie
points out that "[s]ections 2281 and 2282 provide only that an injunction shall not be
'granted' by a single judge," and he implies that the Metropolitan Water Co. case held
contrary to the statutory language. Currie, supra note 5, at 20. However, Title 28 was not
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ever, dismiss a complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction. Thus it was
held in Ex parte Poresky20 that if a claim of unconstitutionality is
"insubstantial," a single district judge may dismiss for lack of federal
jurisdiction. 21 The problem of whether an allegation of unconstitutionality is "substantial" has often provoked litigation. 22 The Supreme
Court's penchant for overruling its previous decisions23 often renders
doubtful an assertion that a statute is clearly constitutional-particularly if the statute might be thought of as restricting Bill of Rights or
fourteenth amendment freedoms.
Relying on Poresky, the Supreme Court held in Bailey v. Patter-

son 24 that the requirement of a substantial constitutional question
means that a three-judge court is not required in order to enjoin the
enforcement of a clearly unconstitutional statute. The Court brushed
aside the applicable statutory language and based its decision on the
ground that the policy behind the three-judge requirement did not
necessitate such courts "when the constitutional issue presented is
essentially fictitious. 2 5 Whether the Bailey rule can be justified in
light of the language of section 2281 seems quite doubtful. The result
can perhaps be explained as an example of the Supreme Court's hostility toward the three-judge court statutes-an attitude shown by its
frequent citation to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum in Phillips v.
law in 1911. Act of March 8, 1911, ch. 321, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162 contained, in substance,
what are now § 2281 and § 2284 without the language of § 2284 that requires a threejudge court to be convened "[i]n any action required ... to be heard and determined by
a district court of three judges ....
The 1911 Act provided instead that a three-judge
court be convened upon the application for an injunction. Thus the Court's holding in
Metropolitan Water Co. was supported by the language of the statute. Note that Title 28
is now positive law; the situation illustrates the change in the meaning of a statute which
can accompany its codification.
20 290 US. 80 (1933).
21 Id. at 31-32. If the statute in question is constitutional, the eleventh amendment or
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 US. 1 (1890), prohibits enjoining its enforcement on other
grounds. See note 18 supra. Thus lack of a substantial constitutional challenge is equivalent to lack of federal jurisdiction. One "exception" may be federal pre-emption cases,
which are not constitutional cases in the sense that they require three-judge courts.
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
22 Some recent cases are: Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1967); Stamler v. Willis, 371 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1966); Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran,
354 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23 Compare Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), with Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958).
24 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
25 Id. at 33. The statutes

do not say that the constitutional issue must be substantial.
Although Poresky may be justified on the theory that there is no ground of unconstitutionality when the statute is patently constitutional, Bailey is a clear case of "judicial
wizardry." 50 CA~iz. L. Rrv. 728, 730 (1962).
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United States26 describing the predecessor of section 2281 as "not...
a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality,
but.., an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to
be applied as such."2 7 The reason for such an attitude is undoubtedly
the direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of three-judge court
decisions.
As a result of Poresky and Bailey, a district court faced with an
application for an injunction against the enforcement of a statute28 on
constitutional grounds is faced with the threshold issue of whether
the statute lies somewhere between clear constitutionality and clear
unconstitutionality. The question is one of degree, "of drawing a line
where no important distinction can be seen between the nearest points
on the two sides, but where the distinction between the extremes is
plain." 2 9 The Court has attempted to prescribe the method for finding
a lack of a substantial federal question,3" but the matter is ultimately
one of the opinion of the judge involved: what is clearly constitutional
to a district judge may well present a substantial constitutional question
to the court of appeals that reviews his decision 3l-even though all the
judges might agree on the merits that the statute concerned is constitutional. The delay occasioned by the rule is apparent. Suppose a
federal judge dismisses a complaint on the ground that the statute is
clearly constitutional. The court of appeals in reviewing the dismissal
cannot decide the constitutional issues-it can decide only if those
issues are substantial, and if it finds that they are, a three-judge court
must be convened to decide those issues.
The uncertainty caused by the presence of an issue that would not
have to be determined to decide the case on the merits is a powerful
argument for the position that all cases within the literal terms of sections 2281 and 2282 should be determined by three-judge courts, but
there are compelling arguments to the contrary. Dispensing with the
Bailey rule would require the awkward three-judge court in routine
cases-such as segregation cases 32 -where the only real dispute is over
26 312 U.S. 246 (1941).

27 Id. at 251.
28 Or administrative order, under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
29 Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 23 (1930) (Holmes, J.).
30 In California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938), the Court
said that "lack of substantiality in .a federal question may appear either because it is
obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous
decisions of this Court as to foreclose the subject." Id. at 255.
31 There is some question as to whether the review should be by appeal or mandamus. See note 85 infra.
32 It is beyond dispute that statutes requiring racial segregation are unconstitutional.
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facts. Even if three-judge court procedures were streamlined, as suggested below,3 3 the direct appeal provisions would increase the Supreme
Court's workload. It is no answer to say that the Supreme Court could
routinely affirm without opinion cases enjoining enforcement of clearly
unconstitutional statutes. 34 Such cases may involve difficult non-constitutional questions. Overruling Poresky would permit a litigant to shortcircuit the court of appeals and obtain direct Supreme Court review
simply by adding a spurious constitutional argument to an ordinary
case. Therefore, the troublesome "clearly constitutional" and "clearly
unconstitutional" exceptions to three-judge court jurisdiction can
feasibly be dispensed with only if three-judge procedure is simplified
and the system of review of three-judge court decisions revised.
Problems similar to those concerning the clearly constitutional
statute are numerous. A number of courts have said that a single district judge can dismiss an application for an injunction on any of the
following grounds: No "case or controversy" is presented; 35 the pleadings do not present a proper case for equitable relief;3 6 the case lacks
ripeness. 37 When such issues are presented should it matter whether
the question is a close one? In Flast v. Gardner38 a major issue was
whether plaintiffs, solely by virtue of their status as federal taxpayers,3 9
had standing to sue. The district judge who first heard the case ruled
that a substantial question of standing was presented, and a three-judge
court was then convened to decide all the issues, including standing. 40
If the ultimate decision in such a case is that plaintiff has standing, the
process followed in Flast leads to little waste of judicial effort, since
a three-judge court would eventually have to be convened to decide
whether the statute is constitutional. If, however, the court finds that
plaintiff does not have standing, as did the second Flast court,41 the
33

See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.

34 This possible approach to review of three-judge court cases is effectively refuted

in Note, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 YA LJ, 164Q, 1655-57 (1963).
35 E.g., Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 833, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
36 E.g., Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929, 930, 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 Us.
960 (1967).
37 E.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 134 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 839 (1967).
3S 267 F, Supp. 351 (S.D.NY. 1967). See also Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
39 The leading cases on this point are Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
and Flast v, Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
40 Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S,D.N.Y. 1967).
41 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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cumbersome three-judge court machinery has been invoked to decide
a point of procedure rather than a constitutional issue. This consideration illustrates the reason for the requirement that a substantial showing of federal jurisdiction be made before a three-judge court is
convened. As in the case of the clearly constitutional or unconstitutional
statute, however, the substantiality question introduces a spurious issue
into many cases.
B. The "Local Applicability" Exception
For purposes of determining three-judge court jurisdiction a
"state statute" is not, as the untutored might think, simply an act passed
by a state legislature. For exampli, in Rorick v. Board of Commissioner4 2 plaintiffs were holders of bonds issued by the Everglades
Drainage District in Florida. The District had been established by a
Florida statute. Later Florida statutes affecting the District were challenged by plaintiffs as imparing the obligation of their "contracts" with
the District.43 Citing dicta in Ex parte Collins,44 the Supreme Court
held on appeal from a three-judge court decision that "the matter ...
in controversy is not one of statewide concern but affects exclusively a
particular district in Florida. ' 45 On that ground it was decided that
46
the case was not one for a three-judge court.
When does a case present "a matter of statewide concern" so as
to require a three-judge court? There is no clear test. Factors which
may be significant are, first, whether the state or federal statute47 applies
only to a limited geographic area; 48 second, whether the issue is such
that a decision against the state will have far-reaching effects; 49 and
42 307 U.S. 208 (1939).

Id. at 211.
44 277 U.S. 565 (1928).

43

307 U.S. at 212.
Because the time for appeal to the court of appeals had lapsed, the Supreme Court
vacated the three-judge court's decree and remanded to the district court so that a new
decree could be entered, from which appeal could be taken. Such is the Court's usual
practice when it holds that a three-judge court was wrongly convened, although the
appealing party can also protect himself by filing a protective appeal with the court of
appeals. The protective appeal may be a poor tactic, however. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Alabama State Teachers' Ass'n v. Pub. Sch. & College Auth., 393 U.S. 400 (1969), cited
appellants' filing of a protective appeal as evidence that they were unsure of three-judge
court jurisdiction.
45

46

47 See text accompanying notes 76-80 infra.
48 See, e.g., Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S.
97 (1967); Rorick v. Bd.of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208 (1939).
49 See text accompanying notes 61-66 infra; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1968).

1969]

THREE-JUDGE COURTS

third, whether the actions sought to be enjoined are, although they
affect only one area of the state, a reflection of state or federal policy.Y°
Rorick is one example of what might be called the "geographic
test." This test seemed to have been clearly formulated by the Supreme
Court in a pair of cases decided on the same day in 1967: only if a
statute applies throughout a state does an action to enjoin its enforcement require three judges. In Moody v. Flowers51 plaintiffs sought to
52
have a county election scheme enjoined on "one man, one vote"
grounds. The scheme was required by a state statute which applied only
to the county concerned. The Court held that a three-judge court
should not have been convened, saying:
The Court has consistently construed [section 2281] . . . as
authorizing a three-judge court not merely because a state statute
is involved but only when a state statute
of general and statewide
53
application is sought to be enjoined.
In response to plaintiffs' urgings that similar apportionment statutes
applied to all counties in Alabama, the Court suggested "that even a
variety of different devices, working perhaps to the same end, still
leaves any one device local rather than statewide . . . ."54 Plaintiffs in
Sailors v. Board of Education 5 challenged the method of electing
county school board members in Michigan. Three-judge court jurisdiction was upheld on the ground that the statute prescribing the
method of election applied generally to all county school boards in
5
the state.1
Whatever the merits of the Moody-Sailors test as an implementation of the policy behind the three-judge court statutes, the rule established by those cases had an appealing clarity. Less than two years after
Moody and Sailors, however, the Supreme Court re-established the
previous confusion. Plaintiffs in Alabama State Teachers Association v.
Public School and College Authority 7 sought to enjoin enforcement
of a statute that authorized defendant to issue bonds to finance con50 This would seem the logical converse of Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928). For
a discussion of the application of this principle to challenges to federal legislation see
Currie, supra note 5, at 34-35.
51 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
52 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53 Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101 (1967) (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 102.
55 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
56 Id. at 107.
57 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd mer., 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
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structiQn of a branch of Auburn University. 8 It is difficult to conceive
of a more "local" statute than one authorizing the financing of a single
college in Montgomery, Alabama; yet the Supreme Court affirmed a
three-judge district court's denial of the injunction."9 Despite Mr.
Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent the court wrote no opinion.o
Although Alabama State Teachers Association seems directly
opposed to the principles announced in Moody and Sailors, the result
may be justified on policy grounds. Plaintiffs' argument against the
Alabama statute was that the state had "an affirmative duty to dismantle" its segregated-in-fact system of higher education., 1 It was
02
argued that the proposed college "did not maximize desegregation"
and that state officials should "utilize new construction or expansion
63
of facilities as an opportunity to dismantle the [segregated] system."
A ruling for plaintiffs by the three-judge district court clearly would
have had a great impact on state policies. 4 Therefore, if one takes the
approach that a three-judge court's primary purpose is to "[increase]
the prestige of the district court and [reassure] the public as to the
breadth and thoroughness of the court's deliberations" 65 in cases where
important issues are raised, the Supreme Court's decision was correct.
On the other hand, if the major reason for the three-judge court system
58 393 U.S. at 402 n.1. A constitutional challenge to the statewide statute creating the
Public School and College Authority was abandoned. Id.
59 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
60 By affirming on the merits, the Court tacitly recognized three-judge court jurisdiction, since a one-judge case would be appealable to the court of appeals rather than
to the Supreme Court.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas argued that three-judge court jurisdiction was proper because the act regulated a state agency. The particular act, however,
concerned only one college. It might be argued that the college would be open tQ all residents of the state, making the act "statewide." But see Rorick v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 307 U.S.
208 (1939), discussed at pp. 934-85 supra. In Ex parte Pub. Nat'l Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928),
a statute establishing a statewide tax to provide funds for the use of one city was held
"local" for three-judge court purposes on the ground that "[t]he persons sued are municipal officers, having no state functions to perform, but charged only with the duty of
collecting ... taxes ... in behalf of the city alone." Id. at 104 (emphasis added). These
cases indicate that the statute was the kind that the Court has considered "local" in the
past.
61 Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Pub. Sch. & Col. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784, 787
(M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd mem. 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
62 Id.
63 Id.

64 The district court actually ruled that in dealing with higher education the courts
need do no more than enforce nondiscriminatory hiring and admissions policies. Id. at
789-90.
65 Note, supranote 34, at 1653.
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is to prevent "one little federal judge" 66 from tying up an important
state regulatory system, a three-judge court hardly seems necessary to
enjoin the construction of one college. But regardless of which purpose
is considered primary, a test that depends on the importance of the
issue hardly seems workable.
A number of cases have held that a single judge can enjoin the
enforcement of a statute applicable to an entire state if the "controversy" is local. The leading case is Ex parte Collins.67 Petitioner argued
that Arizona statutes providing for assessment against property abutting
local improvements violated the fourteenth amendment due process
clause because they did not give the property owners a hearing. 68
Although the statutes had statewide application, the Supreme Court
held that because "defendants are local officers and the suit involves
matters of interest only to the particular municipality . involved,"6 9
a three-judge court was not required. The Court pointed out that it
was the enforcement of the city resolution authorizing the paving of
70
a street, not the statute itself, which petitioner sought to enjoin.
Surely, however, it was the constitutionality of the statute, not the
resolution, which was challenged. Collinsseems to suggest that a statute
which is not self-executing but merely authorizes local action may be
declared unconstitutional by a single judge. Support for this position
is provided by Griffin v. County School Board.7 1 In 1959, as a result
of the Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions, Virginia
72
enacted legislation making school attendance a matter of local option.
Because of court decisions requiring integration, Prince Edward
County closed its public schools. An action was brought by Negro children to compel the reopening of those schools, The Court held that
the case was properly heard by a single judge, stating:
While a holding as to the constitutional duty of the ... officials

of Prince Edward County may have repercussions over the State
it is nevertheless true that what is attacked inthis suit is not
*
something which the State has commanded Prince Edward to do66 "I am opposed to allowing one little federal judge to stand up against the . . .

State and say, 'This act is unconstitutional.'" 45

CONG.

REc. 7256 (1910) (Senator Over-

man). See Currie, supranote 5, at 7.
67 277 U.S. 565 (1928).
68 Id. at 567.
69 Id.at 568.
70 Id. at 569.
71 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
72 Previously, the Virginia legislature had established tuition grants for children
attending private nonsectarian schools. Id. at 221.
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close its public schools and give grants to children in private
schools-but rather something which the county with state acquiescence and cooperation has undertaken to do on its own
volition,
73
a decision not binding on any other county in Virginia.
It has been argued forcefully that Collins and Griffin may have
been wrongly decided,7 4 and in any event it is not clear how much
of those cases remains after Alabama State Teachers Association. But
contrary results would either require a three-judge court to enjoin the
paving of a single street, as in Collins, or introduce one more factor
of uncertainty into an already murky area of the law. For it seems
that if either case is correctly decided, both are. The only possible
distinction between Collins and Griffin7 5 is that in the latter case an
important state policy was involved, while in Collins the state would
probably not have been greatly disturbed by being required to give
property owners a hearing before assessing them. Requiring the courts
to decide whether a case concerns an "important" state policy would
invite chaos similar to that which flows from the "clearly constitutional
-clearly unconstitutional" doctrines.
The basis for the "local" exception with respect to state statutes is
the language of section 2281, which provides that three-judge courts
are required when a statute is sought to be enjoined "by restraining
the action of any officer of such State . . . . "76 By ruling that a local
officer is a "state officer" when he is implementing state policies, and
that a state employee is not a "state officer" when implementing policies
of local concern,77 the courts have reconciled the "local" exception with
the language of section 2281. There is apparently no statutory basis
for a similar exception with respect to federal statutes, since the section
concerning them, section 2282, contains no reference to federal officers.
Nevertheless, in Flast v. Cohen,7 8 wherein defendants argued that a
three-judge court should not have been convened because plaintiffs
sought to enjoin federal expenditures made in a single school district,
the Court held that a three-judge court was proper because a decision
against a particular program "would cast sufficient doubt on similar
73 Id. at 228.
74 Currie, supra note 5, at 34.
75 Professor Currie states that if the three-judge court question was first raised in
the Supreme Court in Griffln, it should have been dismissed as untimely. Currie, supra
note 5,at 48 n.252. The Court, however, regards such questions as affecting subject-matter
jurisdiction and will not allow the matter to be waived. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 88 n.2 (1968).
76 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
77 See, e.g., Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1967).
78 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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programs elsewhere that confusion approaching paralysis would surround the challenged statute."7 9 Thus the Court treated the issue
much as it might have treated one concerning a state statute.8 0
II
STREAMLINING THREE-JUDGE COURT PROCEDURE:

A

PROPOSAL

Who should decide initially whether a case requires three judges?
Section 2284 provides that the district judge faced with an application
for an injunction "shall immediately notify the chief judge of the
circuit, who shall designate two other judges ... ."81 This procedure is
to be followed "[fln any action... required.., to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges .... ,,82 The statute, therefore,
leaves the question open.
In most cases, the initial decision has been made by the district
judge.8 3 If that judge decides that a three-judge court is required, no
particular problems arise. If, however, he decides that a three-judge
court is not necessary, considerable delay may ensue. Suppose that his
decision is wrong and that he decides the case on the merits. The entire
case will have to be re-tried by a three-judge court. Or suppose that a
single judge wrongly dismisses the action on a ground such as the clear
constitutionality of the challenged statute. The court of appeals8 4 must
then reverse his decision and somehow (just how is most unclear 5 )
convene a three-judge court. The court of appeals will not decide
whether the statute was constitutional-it will decide only whether a
three-judge court should have determined the constitutional issue.
79 Id. at 89-90.
80 There are few decisions concerning the local applicability exception as applied to

federal statutes. Professor Currie argues that although there should be a local applicability exception to § 2282, the test should differ from the tests under § 2281. Currie,
supra note 5, at 34-37.
81 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1) (1964).
82 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).

83 Alternatively, the chief judge of the court of appeals to whom the request for a
three-judge court is made under § '2284 could decide the matter-but if that were the
process, who would review his decision? Application to the Supreme Court for a writ
of mandamus would seem the only possibility. Decision by the chief judge is the practice
in the Third Circuit. See Miller v. Smith, 236 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus denied
sub nom. Miller v. Biggs, 382 U.S. 805 (1965). See generally Note, Reviewing the Grant of
a Three-Judge Court, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 146 (1969).
84 It is now settled that review of the decision by a single judge not to convene a

three-judge court is available in the courts of appeals. Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S.
427 (1967); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 716 (1962).
85 Both appeal and mandamus to the court of appeals have been used. Compare

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:928

The problems created by having a single judge decide whether
a case is one for three judges have led the Fifth Circuit to a new approach. In Jackson v. Choate88 a single judge refused to request a
three-judge court on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was presented. 7 Plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the convening of a three-judge court. The court of appeals
did not decide whether the case required a three-judge court; rather,
the application for mandamus was dismissed, and Chief Judge Brown
ordered a three-judge court convened. 88 Whether the case was one for
three judges was left for the three-judge court to decide.89 Should
the three-judge court decide that the case requires a single judge, all
three judges could join in the single judge's holding on the merits. 0
The chief advantage of the Jackson procedure is the simplification
of appellate review. If the three-judge court decides that a case was
one for a single judge, the court of appeals can review that decision as
well as the merits. 91 If the court of appeals finds that a three-judge
court was proper, there is no need for a new trial, since three judges
92
have already heard the case.
Chief Judge Brown's approach in Jackson seems the best way now
available to overcome the waste caused by review only of the "one
judge or three" issue. However, since Jackson results essentially in a
three-judge court's being convened in all cases in which there is even a
chance that three judges are needed, the number of three-judge trials
may increase considerably. And certainly "[c]onsuming the energies of
three judges to conduct one trial is prima facie an egregious waste of
resources." 93 It is possible, however, to devise a system which preserves
any possible advantage of three-judge determination of constitutional
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1967) (appeal), with Reed
Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (mandamus). In Reed Enterprises
the court of appeals ruled that a three-judge court should have heard the case, but rather
than issue a writ of mandamus it took no action, since it "assume[d] that the respondents
will take appropriate action in requesting three-judge courts." Id. at 524.
86 404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1968).
87 Id. at 911.
88 Id. at 914.

89 Id. at 912, 914.
90 Id. at 913. This assumes, of course, that all three judges agree on the merits. If
they do not, the disagreement itself would seem to establish that there is sufficient doubt
about the issues to make the case one which raises a substantial constitutional question
and thus properly a three-judge case.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 913-14.
93 Currie, supra note 5, at 2.
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issues, yet which eliminates much of the waste necessitated by a threejudge trial.
The reason for the three-judge requirement in constitutional cases
is that there be adequate deliberation before a statute is declared unconstitutional.9 4 Why then, should three judges decide anything but
constitutional issues? Why should three judges be required to decide
questions such as standing? Are three judges required to rule on the
admissibility of evidence? To make findings of fact? Three-judge court
policy demands no such thing.
The three-judge court statutes should be revised. An application for
an injunction, interlocutory or permanent, should be heard by a single
district judge who would make findings of fact and decide all questions
of law other than those involving the constitutionality of a statute. If,
at the end of the trial, it appears that the constitutionality of a statute
must be determined, a hearing on that issue alone should be held before three judges, one of whom would be the trial judge. 95 If those
judges held a statute unconstitutional their decision should be appealable as of right to the Supreme Court. Otherwise, review should be in
the court of appeals. 96
The above proposal would eliminate much of the awkwardness of
three-judge proceedings. As a result, the requirement that a constitutional question be substantial to require a three-judge court could be
dispensed with. The exception to three-judge court jurisdiction for
statutes of local applicability could be eliminated. Since three judges
04 See text accompanying note 15 supra.

95 This procedure would not eliminate the problem of dealing with frivolous constitutional challenges, and it might at times be necessary to convene three judges for a
hearing on such challenges. However, this would seem preferable to the present system of
letting a single judge decide such questions with the ever-present possibility of a higher
court deciding that the question was, after all, substantial and that a new trial must be had.
In most civil law jurisdictions important civil cases are decided by courts of three
or more judges. See R. SCHLESINGER, ComPARA=v LAW 209-10 n.22 (2d ed. 1959). Most of
the proceedings in such cases, particularly in Italy, are before a single judge. Id. at 223
n.6. Italian three-judge court procedure has been criticized on two grounds. Sereni,
Basic Features of Civil Procedure in Italy, 1 Am. J. CoMP. L. 373, 385-88 (1952). First, it
is said that "the entire court, as a rule, is not in a position to hear or see the entire evidence in the vivid, concentrated form and with the immediate effect which is achieved
at the trial." Id. at 385. This is objectionable only because these courts decide questions
of fact. Second, it is said that "the opinion of the inquiring judge acquires a preponderant influence in the decision of the case." Id. at 387. Again, this objection applies
primarily when a court is determining facts, as do civilian courts. See id. at 887-88.
90 Perhaps provision should also be made for direct appeal in cases where speedy
disposition of the matter is important, as is presently done under the three-judge court
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See note 8 supra.
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would not be needed to decide threshold questions, review in the court
of appeals of dismissals on the ground of standing, ripeness, mootness,
political question, or adequate remedy at law could be on the merits,
not on the narrow issue of whether the question presented was substantial. Every advantage of the present three-judge court system would
be retained, yet a case could no longer be protracted for years because
97
of the issue of the number of judges needed.
Alan M. Gunn
97

Lest there be any doubt as to the importance of this problem, the reader should

now re-examine note 6 supra.

